海外之声 | IMI国际顾问委员：银行监管阻碍美国经济复苏（中英双语）

观点速递

史蒂夫·汉克，IMI国际顾问委员、约翰霍普金斯大学应用经济学教授。原文在2017年5月31日发表于Forbes.com。《福布斯杂志》是一个可靠的商业新闻和金融信息的主要来源。

作者首先描述了货币供应量与国内生产总值（GDP）的关系，提出两者应呈正相关。通过广义货币增长率和私人信贷、名义总需求的对比，作者得到“广义货币增速尽管加快了步伐，但仍然增长乏力”的结论。

究其原因，作者认为，美国央行在危机过后为了避免风险，对商业银行要求较高的资本资产比率。这使得银行为了达到监管要求，减少负债规模或进行股权融资，这都会造成货币供应量的收缩。最后作者提出，经济繁荣时期应实行较高的资本要求，而低迷时期应采取相反的举措。

中文译文如下：

银行监管如何阻碍美国经济复苏

史蒂夫·汉克

翻译：李响

审校：肖柏高

货币很重要——这是米尔顿·弗里德曼的格言之一。自2007年北岩发生银行挤兑（也就是金融危机的开场），广义上的货币供应在美国、英国和欧元区遭到了打击。

在美国，货币供应量增长有所回升。这是一个积极的迹象，因为货币数量和名义国内生产总值（GDP）与总需求密切相关。的确，如果广义货币稳健增长，那么由实际和通货膨胀组成的名义GDP也将稳健增长，反之亦然。

在衡量货币供应量时，我们必须记住诺贝尔经济学家和经济理论大鳄约翰·希克斯爵士的话：没有什么比资产负债表更重要的了。

货币供应这部分作为负债出现在银行的资产负债表上。货币供应只是金融部门的所有存款和其他各种短期负债的总和。在资产负债表上，资产总额必须等于总负债。因此，货币供应（短期负债）必须在资产负债表上具有资产或长期负债对应物（见下表）。

货币金融机构的资产负债表

其中一个对应物称为信贷，它包括各种金融工具,如私人贷款、抵押等。金钱和信贷通常被混淆为同义词，但它们不是相同的东西——信用是金钱的对应。任何称职的经济学家都应该时刻关注货币供应。但是，看看金融部门对这些存款做什么也很重要：他们是否将这笔钱注入了经济体？如果是这样，给了谁？货币供应有一个非常重要且特别值得关注的对应物，即对个人和企业的贷款，被称为“私人信贷”。

在美国，货币供应量（Divisia M4）的变动和私人信贷往往变动方向相同。自2013年以来，广义货币供应量的年增长率已经开始增长（见下图）。

美国货币供应量（Divisia M4）和私人信贷

事实上，Divisia M4的年增长率最近达到了趋势增长率（4.41%）。但是，该增长率随后又回落，目前略低于趋势增长率。

在Divisia M4增长缓慢的这一时期内，私人信贷的增长率变得强劲，并且在2014年大部分时间里， 41 36931 41 15232 0 0 4209 0 0:00:08 0:00:03 0:00:05 4208经远远高于趋势增长率（5.84%）。因此，货币和信贷增长看起来相当有前景。毕竟它们是名义总需求增长的前兆。

在所附图表中可以看到广义货币增长率（Divisia M4）与名义总需求（由代理最终销售给国内采购商的数量来衡量）之间的联系。图表的有趣之处是，它证实了美国仍然处于增长衰退期——美国货币供应量正在增长，但在以最终销售给国内采购商的数量衡量时，其增长率低于趋势增长率（4.32%对4.70%）。其部分原因是广义货币增速尽管加快了步伐，但仍然增长乏力。

美国销售给国内采购商的最终数量和名义年增长率

对于许多人来说，货币增长乏力听起来很奇怪。毕竟，美联储在2008年危机之后打开了货币放水的管道（见：量化宽松政策）。但是，美联储只是直接控制所谓的国家货币，也称基础货币，包括流通中的货币和与美联储的银行储备。绝大多数货币供应量在使用宽松尺度进行衡量时，就是所谓的银行资金。这是私人银行部门通过货币创造产生的资金，其中包括流动的、类似货币的资产，如需求和储蓄存款。

美联储在基础货币方面确实相当宽松。基础货币供应量占总货币供应量的比例由M4衡量，并从危机前的5%上升到今天的18%。但是，若非来自中央银行，大部分广义货币（另外82％的货币供应量）来自哪里呢？它们来自商业银行。且这就是金融监管的情况。

有一段时间，我曾发出警告，在经济衰退期间施行较高银行资本金要求是错误的（见：顺周期），因为它们挤压了货币供应，扼杀了经济增长。迄今为止，实施这些资本要求的结果是金融抑制，即一种信贷紧缩。这已经被证明是萧条状态中不可行的一项措施了。

金融危机过后，世界各地的政治家、监管者和中央银行家们均对商业银行家进行了指责。他们认为，预防未来危机的关键是采取更严格的规章和更积极的监管,主要是对银行更高的资本要求。

如果在经济繁荣期间实行较高的资本要求，这将会很好。因为资本金的增加导致货币供应量增长放缓，给经济降温。但是，在经济衰退或经济增长衰退期间提高资本金要求时，就会成为顺周期性事件，实际上会使事情变得更糟。

对于银行而言，其资产（现金、贷款和证券）必须等于其负债（资本、债券、银行欠股东和客户的负债）。在大多数国家里，银行负债的大部分（大约90%）是存款。由于存款可以用来支付，它们是“钱”。因此，大多数银行负债都是金钱。

为提高资本资产比率，银行可以增加资本或减少风险资产。如果银行减少风险资产，其存款负债将下降。因此，货币余额就减少。

提高银行资本资产比率的另一个办法就是筹集新资金。此举措同样也减少了货币。当投资者购买新发行的银行股权时，投资者就用银行账户交换新股。这样一来减少了银行体系中的存款负债，并清除了资金。

因此，矛盾的是，以让银行更安全的名义，迫使银行降低杠杆率和缩减资产负债表的行为破坏了货币余额。这反过来又影响了公司的流动性和资产价格。这样也可以减少相对于无更高资本的资产比率情况下的支出。

美国采用了宽松的基础货币和紧缩的银行货币政策组合。确实，对于所有关于量化宽松和美联储宽松货币政策的讨论来说，不能忽视的事实是,广义美国总体货币供应量仍处于平衡状态，但有一点偏紧——这主要是由于不合时的银行资本的增加。

英文原文如下：

How Bank Regulations Hinder the U.S. Recovery

By Steve H. Hanke

Money matters — it’s one of Milton Friedman’s maxims. Since the Northern Rock bank run of 2007 — the “opening shot” of the financial crisis — the money supply, broadly measured, in the United States, Great Britain, and the Eurozone has taken a beating.

In the United States, money supply growth has rebounded somewhat. This is a positive sign, because the quantity of money and nominal gross domestic product (GDP), as well as related measures of aggregate demand, are all closely related. Indeed, if broad money growth is robust, the nominal GDP, which is composed of real and inflation components, will be robust and vice versa.

When it comes to measuring the money supply, we must heed the words of Sir John Hicks, a Nobelist and high priest of economic theory: There is nothing more important than a balance sheet.

Components of the money supply appear on a bank’s balance sheet as liabilities. The money supply is simply the sum all of the deposits and various other short-term liabilities of the financial sector. On every balance sheet, the sum total of assets must equal total liabilities. In consequence, the money supply (short-term liabilities) must have either an asset or longer-term liability counterpart on the balance sheet (see the chart below).

The balance sheet of monetary financial institutions.

One of these counterparts is known as credit, and it includes various financial instruments, such as private loans, mortgages, etc. Money and credit are often confused as synonyms, but they are not the same thing — credit is a counterpart to money. Any economist worth his salt should have the money supply on his dashboard. But, it is also important to look at what the financial sector is doing with these deposits — are they lending this money back out to the economy, and if so, to whom? There is one very important counterpart of the money supply that is particularly worth looking at — loans to private individuals and businesses, known as “private credit.”

In the U.S., movements in the money supply (Divisia M4) and private credit tend to move in the same direction. Since 2013, the year-over-year growth rate of the money supply, broadly measured, has started to increase (see the chart below).

U.S. money supply (Divisia M4) and private credit

Indeed, the Divisia M4 annual growth rate reached its trend rate of growth (4.41%) recently. But, it has subsequently slipped back and is currently a bit below the trend rate.

During this period of modest acceleration in Divisia M4 growth, the growth rate in private credit has strongly accelerated and has been comfortably above its trend rate of growth (5.84%) for most of the 2014-2017 period. So, money and credit growth look rather promising. After all, they are precursors of nominal aggregate demand growth.

This linkage between the growth rate in broad money (Divisia M4) and nominal aggregate demand (measured by the proxy final sales to domestic purchasers) can be observed in the accompanying chart. The interesting aspect of the chart is that it confirms that the U.S. is still in a growth recession — the U.S. is growing, but growing at below its trend rate when measured by final sales to domestic purchasers (4.32% versus 4.70%). This has resulted, in part, because broad money growth has been anemic, even though it has picked up the pace recently.

U.S. final sales to domestic purchasers, nominal annual growth rates

For many, the idea of anemic money growth sounds strange. After all, the Fed turned on the money pumps in the wake of the 2008 crisis (read: engaged in quantitative easing). But, the Fed only directly controls what is known as state money, also known as the monetary base, which includes currency in circulation and bank reserves with the Fed. The vast majority of the money supply, when properly measured using a broad metric, is what is known as bank money. This is money produced by the private banking sector via deposit creation, and it includes liquid, money-like assets such as demand and savings deposits.

The Fed has indeed been quite loose when it comes to state money, with the state money portion of the total money supply, measured by M4, increasing from 5% of the total before the crisis, to 18% today. But where does the lion’s share of broad money (the other 82% of the money supply) come from, if not from the central bank? It comes from commercial banks. And that is where financial regulation comes into the picture.

For some time, I have warned that higher bank capital requirements, when imposed in the middle of an economic slump, are wrong-headed (read: pro-cyclical) because they put a squeeze on the money supply and stifle economic growth. Thus far, the result of efforts to impose these capital requirements has been financial repression — a credit crunch. This has proven to be a deadly cocktail to ingest in the middle of a slump.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, politicians, regulators, and central bankers around the world have pointed their accusatory fingers at commercial bankers. They assert that the keys to preventing future crises are tougher regulations and more aggressive supervision, centered around higher capital requirements for banks.

This would be fine if higher capital requirements were being imposed during an economic boom, because capital hikes cause money supply growth to slow, which tends to cool down the economy. But, when capital hikes are imposed during a slump or a growth recession, they become pro-cyclical and actually make things worse. Indeed, the imposition of higher capital requirements in the wake of the financial crisis has caused banks to shrink their loan books and dramatically increase their cash and government securities positions.

For a bank, its assets (cash, loans and securities) must equal its liabilities (capital, bonds and liabilities that the bank owes to its shareholders and customers). In most countries, the bulk of a bank’s liabilities (roughly 90%) are deposits. Since deposits can be used to make payments, they are “money.” Accordingly, most bank liabilities are money.

To increase their capital-asset ratios, banks can either boost capital or shrink risk assets. If banks shrink their risk assets, their deposit liabilities will decline. In consequence, money balances will be destroyed.

The other way to increase a bank’s capital-asset ratio is by raising new capital. This, too, destroys money. When an investor purchases newly-issued bank equity, the investor exchanges funds from a bank account for new shares. This reduces deposit liabilities in the banking system and wipes out money.

So, paradoxically, the drive to deleverage banks and to shrink their balance sheets, in the name of making banks safer, destroys money balances. This, in turn, dents company liquidity and asset prices. It also reduces spending relative to where it would have been without higher capital-asset ratios.

The United States has employed a loose state money/tight bank moneymonetary policy mix. Yes, for all the talk of quantitative easing and the Fed’s loose monetary policy, the inconvenient truth is that the overall money supply in the U.S., broadly measured, is still, on balance, somewhat tight to neutral — thanks in large part to ill-timed bank capital hikes.

This article appeared on Forbes.com on May 31, 2017.

观点整理  田雯

图文编辑  田雯

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